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In this paper, we analyse the performance of the tax administration using data envel-
opment analysis (DEA) and regression analysis in 13 European countries. In the ﬁrst
phase, a DEA input- oriented model with the three input and two output parameters
for the efﬁciency evaluation has been used. The inﬂuence of selected independent
variables on the grey economy, which represents an approximation of tax evasion
and efﬁciency of tax administration, was conducted by regression analysis in the sec-
ond phase. The main goal is to investigate the inﬂuence of the relative efﬁciency and
number of employees in tax administration as well as country employment rate on
the grey economy level.
Keywords: tax administration; data envelopment analysis; regression analysis
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1. Introduction
Tax policy and tax administration are the most important part of every tax system
reform. Administrative dimensions of tax system reform should not be ignored (Bird,
2004). In the situation with full tax compliance, which is extreme and an ideal situation,
the role of tax administration would be restricted to the provision of facilities for citi-
zens to discharge their responsibilities to the society. In the case of non-compliance, Tax
Administration will have to play the role of policeman. Due to lack of resources and in
the situation that it cannot play the role of a policeman to all taxpayers, Tax Administra-
tion has to support voluntary compliance and to ﬁght against tax evasion. Tax evasion
is one of the most common economic crimes, and has been present since the introduc-
tion of taxes. The fundamental role of the tax administration is to render quality tax-
payer services and to encourage voluntary compliance of tax laws, and also to detect
and penalise non-compliance. The extent of success of the Tax Administration in its role
should be reﬂected through a higher level of tax compliance and a lower level of tax
evasion. Only with collected taxes are governments able to provide all public services
and to implement welfare programmes.
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An adequate Tax Compliance model is essential for every tax administration. The
model is based on two elements: attitude to compliance and compliance strategy. The
strategy of the Tax Administration should be to create pressure down, or in other words
to use the compliance strategy to help taxpayers to pay taxes on one side and to ﬁght
against tax evasion on the other. Namely, the vast majority of taxpayers want to comply
with their taxation obligation. This is very important, because the Tax Administration
has to take an adequate compliance model in this respect. It includes all the initiatives
that the authority might take to improve service delivery. In order to measure how efﬁ-
cient a tax administration is in implementing a compliance strategy several methods are
used. The main methods have been developed by the European Commission (2007),
and jointly by the International Finance Corporation, Price Waterhouse Coopers and the
World Bank (2012), by the International Monetary Fund (2012), by the World Bank
(2012), and by the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration for the Forum on
Tax Administration (2009). Other models that have been used to assess the performance
of a tax administration are the following: International Tax Dialogue (2010); Public
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Framework (PEFA, 2013); the
USAID′s Collecting Taxes Database (USAID, 2013); and Diagnostic Framework for
Revenue Administration (Gill, 2000). The assessment of the efﬁciency of the tax admin-
istration using DEA is very rare, probably due to the lack of information regarding the
tax administration. In the literature, the articles from Moesen and Persoon (2002),
Gonzalez and Mile (2000), and Barros (2007) are the most prominent ones.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology
that is used. Section 3 presents empirical results of DEA analysis, where the perfor-
mance of the selected tax administration is assessed. Section 4 shows regression analysis
that is conducted in order to assess the inﬂuence of the chosen variables on the grey
economy, as an approximation of tax evasion and tax administration efﬁciency. Finally,
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. Methodology
The idea of efﬁciency measurement was developed by Farrell (1957) when he used a
non-parametric efﬁciency limits approach to measure the efﬁciency of the relative dis-
tances from the efﬁcient frontier. This measure, which is well known as an empirical or
relative efﬁciency was later expanded in the work of other researchers. The DEA was
introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). Their model is known as the CCR
model. Business units, their activities or processes in the DEA terminology are seen as
Decision Making Units (DMU). DMU is the unit that actually makes business decisions,
and whose performance is characterised by a set of inputs and outputs and their interde-
pendence. It operates with constant returns to scale (CRS), which implies that a change
in the amounts of the inputs leads to the same proportional change in the amounts of
the outputs. The efﬁciency ratio is scaled between 0 and 1, and all efﬁcient units have
the same ratio equal to 1. Following this model, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984)
have extended the original CCR model by introducing the assumption of variable
returns to scale (VRS). In the literature, this model is known as a BCC model. The
VRS efﬁciency scores measure pure technical efﬁciency, excluding the effects of scale
operations. They are greater than the corresponding CRS efﬁciency scores. The BCC
model is able to distinguish between technical and scale inefﬁciency. Technical inefﬁ-
ciency is calculated by measuring how well the unit uses its inputs to create outputs,
while scale inefﬁciency identiﬁes whether increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to
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scale exist. There are two main orientations of the DEA model: input and output orien-
tation. The input-oriented DEA model aims to minimise the input with a given level of
output. On the other side, the output-oriented DEA model aims to maximise the output
with a given level of input. In the envelopment model, the number of degrees of free-
dom will increase with the number of DMUs and decrease with the number of inputs
and outputs. A rule of thumb that can provide guidance is as follows (Cooper, Seiford,
& Tone, 2000): n maxfm s; 3 ðmþ sÞg; where n is number of DMUs, m is num-
ber of inputs and s is number of outputs. This pre-condition has been fulﬁlled by the
analysis in this paper.
Consider a set of n DMUs, with each DMUj ( j=1,…,n), using m inputs xij (i=1,…,m)
and generating s outputs yrj (r=1,…, s).Then the primal linear programme for the (input-
based) CCR model, that gives optimal efﬁciency score θ* for DMU0, can be written as:




kjxij hxi0; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .;m
Pn
j¼1
kjyrj yr0; r ¼ 1; 2; . . .; s
kj 0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n
(1)
where θ is the efﬁciency score for the particular DMU, xio and yro are, respectively, the
ith input and rth output for DMU0 under evaluation, while λj represents the unknown
value assigned to DMUj, j=1,...,n. The efﬁcient frontier consists of DMUs with λj ≥ 0.
















where ur is the weight assigned to output r, r=1,..,s and υi is weight assign to input i,
i=1,..,m. A DMU0 is said to be CCR efﬁcient if and only if θ*= 1 and all optimum
slack values in Equation (1) are zero.
In this paper, DEA is used for comparative analysis of tax administration efﬁciency
in the selected countries. The procedure of applying the DEA method could be divided
into the following steps (Popović & Martić, 2005):
1. Choosing and deﬁnition of DMUs,
2. Deﬁning relevant inputs and outputs,
3. Choosing an adequate DEA model, and
4. DEA model solving, analysing and interpretation of results.
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In this paper, the analysis will be done in two stages. The ﬁrst stage is DEA analy-
sis. The second stage is a regression analysis that explains the inﬂuence of DEA efﬁ-
ciency and other selected variables on the grey economy as an approximation of tax
evasion and the efﬁciency of the tax administration. Namely, the ﬁrst systematic theoret-
ical analysis of tax evasion was done by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where individ-
uals pays taxes because they are afraid of getting caught and penalised if they do not
report all income. The probability of getting caught is higher with a more efﬁcient tax
administration. Furthermore, according to Escobari (2012), a more efﬁcient tax adminis-
tration yields higher tax compliance levels and lower tax evasion. Lower tax evasion
can be achieved by increasing the number of tax auditors and improving their skills in
discovering tax evasion. Both of these theories have shown that the capacity of tax
administration is a vital element for ﬁghting against tax evasion. In this paper, the efﬁ-
ciency of the tax administration will be obtained through DEA analysis, and used in
regression analysis as an explanatory variable in the tax evasion model. The assumption
is that tax administration efﬁciency will have a negative impact on the level of tax
evasion.
The following countries have been selected as a DMU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain. The countries are selected based on the following criteria: countries
that have a similar economic and political legacy to Serbia (Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia); EU mem-
bers due to fact that Serbia wants to became member of the EU and to align its own
taxation system according to the EU standards; countries in the region (Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Slovenia); and developed countries (Finland, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain)
whose standards Serbia wants to reach in the long term. As already mentioned, the anal-
yses has been done in two phases and the results are given in the following sections.
3. DEA efﬁciency measurement
In the ﬁrst stage, the following input and output parameters have been used. The param-
eters are determined by the goal deﬁnition, which is measuring the efﬁciency of the tax
administration. The following inputs are used:
• Total expenditure of the tax administration /net revenue collected – X1.
• Tax Payments – X2.
• Time to comply – X3.
On the other side, output parameters are:
• Tax collected/total amount for collection (theoretical tax) – Y1.
• Value of completed actions/net revenue collected – Y2.
The Tax payments and Time to comply are represented as a rank of the selected
countries on the overall rank list given by the International Finance Corporation (2012).
The main functions of every tax administrations are collection and audit. The goal is to
collect as much tax revenue as possible, according to the tax law, with limited
resources. All necessary data for the selected tax administrations are available. Values of
inputs and outputs are related to 2012 and 2011 respectively. In order to follow the
assumptions of cross-sectional data analysis, both data in DEA and regression analysis
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 1141
refer to year 2012, except for output data in DEA analysis. Namely, output data related
to the tax administration are produced every two years, and not every year. The reason
is that output data are not changing signiﬁcantly over one year. Actually, data on the
economy are changing signiﬁcantly only in the medium and long term, and not in such
a short term. In addition, the output data are given as a ratio and not in nominal terms,
which leads towards an insigniﬁcant difference in values over one year, if there is a dif-
ference at all. Value of inputs and outputs are given in Table 1.
For the efﬁciency assessment, an input-oriented CRS DEA model has been used, as
explained in Equation (1). The CRS model was chosen because it is more rigorous in
assessment of efﬁciency than the VRS model. In addition, it allows better discrimination
between efﬁcient and inefﬁcient units. The Efﬁciency Measurement System (EMS) soft-
ware, which is created within an MS Excel environment (Scheel, 1998), has been used
for evaluation. We use an input-oriented model, as the assumption of CRS would mean
reciprocal values for the results of the output-oriented model. Efﬁciency scores of the
tax administration are shown in Table 2.
The relative efﬁcient DMU are the following tax administrations: Slovenia, Finland,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The relative inefﬁcient tax administrations are in Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia. The number of appearance of the relative efﬁcient DMU as a benchmark for
the relative inefﬁcient DMU is given in Table 2. In total, ﬁve out of 13 tax administra-
tions are relatively efﬁcient. The benchmark for the Serbian Tax Administration (STA),
according to this analysis, is the Finnish Tax Administration. Namely, in order to
become relatively efﬁcient and to reach the Finnish Tax Administration’s performance,
the STA has to move up to the 107th rank position regarding the number of tax pay-
ments (Input 2) and up to the 80th rank position regarding the total time to comply
(Input 3). In the nominal terms, and looking into the rank of the other countries on the
above-mentioned parameters (IFC, 2012), the tax payments should be approximately at









Bulgaria 1.31 59.00 166.00 11.10 2.50
Czech Rep. 1.43 17.00 169.00 5.10 1.80
Hungary 1.60 46.00 124.00 9.90 8.90
Serbia**** 0.90 177.00 125.00 2.71 3.38
Slovak Rep. 1.65 103.00 100.00 17.70 9.60
Slovenia 0.86 83.00 109.00 55.70 1.60
Latvia 1.31 11.00 128.00 18.00 4.10
Lithuania 0.91 40.00 61.00 34.30 2.50
Finland 0.64 17.00 19.00 28.00 5.20
Estonia 0.77 17.00 16.00 12.50 2.00
Ireland 0.76 17.00 9.00 13.40 1.60
Portugal 1.55 17.00 121.00 14.40 9.70
Spain 0.87 17.00 66.00 34.60 4.90
Note: The meaning of input and output parameters has given earlier; the output elements for the Serbian Tax
Administration have been calculated by the authors.
Source: *IOTA (2013); **IFC (2012); ***OECD (2011).
1142 G. Savić et al.
the level of 32 days instead of the current 66 days, and the total time to comply should
be approximately at the level of 207 days instead of the current 279 days. The total
expenditure of the tax administration/net revenue collected (Input 1) should remain at
the same level.
4. Regression model measurement
In the second stage we use the grey economy1 as an approximation of tax evasion that
indirectly refers to the level of efﬁciency of the tax administration. As was mentioned,
the main aim of the tax administration is to decrease levels of tax evasion. In that con-
text, the term ‘grey economy’ is strongly connected with tax evasion. The grey econ-
omy is the basis for tax evasion and refers to that part of the economy that generates
income, but goes untaxed. It comprises a wide range of economic activities. For this
aspect of the economy there are a lot of adjectives that can be used to describe this
activity (Brooks, 2001, p. 8): grey, black, cash, etc. The level of the grey economy will
be used as a proxy to measure tax evasion. The ﬁrst boundary lies between transactions
that constitute production and those that do not. The second boundary is the ofﬁcial pro-
duction boundary, which represents what actually appears in a country’s national
accounts. It is inside the ﬁrst boundary because ofﬁcial statistics more strictly deﬁne
what constitutes production than do economists. The third boundary delimits the grey
(black) economy. Three different types of economic activity can be distinguished within
the grey economy category. Two of them (δ and γ) belong to both categories (formal
and grey economies) because some activities may successfully be concealed from the
tax authorities but show up in estimated expenditures (the reason is that statistics on
national accounts are cross-checked from several sources). The third part of the grey
economy is the beneﬁt from fraud and tax evasion outside the production sector.
It can be assumed that a more efﬁcient tax administration leads toward a lower level
of the grey economy. The following explanatory variables have been used in regression
analysis in order to explain factors that inﬂuence on the size of the grey economy (y):
Table 2. Efﬁciency scores.
DMU Score Benchmarks
1 Bulgaria 0.23 9 (0.48)
2 Czech Rep. 0.23 12 (0.14) 13
(0.09)
3 Hungary 0.68 9 (1.71)




6 Slovenia 1.00 1
7 Latvia 0.99 12 (0.20) 13
(0.44)
8 Lithuania 0.77 6 (0.20) 9 (0.82)
9 Finland 1.00 6
10 Estonia 0.53 9 (0.37) 11 (0.16)
11 Ireland 1.00 1
12 Portugal 1.00 2
13 Spain 1.00 2
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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• DEA efﬁciency score (presented in the Table 2) – Z1.
• Rate of unemployment (%) – Z2.
• Total number of employees in tax administration – Z3.
In this paper, the focus is on the relationship between a dependent variable (y) and
more independent variables (Z1, Z2, and Z3). The equation can be written as:
yi ¼ b0 þ b1Z1 þ b2Z2 þ b3Z3 þ ei
where coefﬁcients β are deﬁned as regression parameters. The residual has to be dis-
tributed as: εi ~ N(0,σ
2). Values of variables are given in the Table 3. The null hypothe-
sis is that the regression parameters (β1, β2, and β3) are each equal to zero (which is
done with the t-test on each of the coefﬁcients) at signiﬁcance level 0.10. All data in
the Table 3 regarding variables y, Z2, and Z3 are related to 2012.
The assumption is that an increase in DEA efﬁciency score and in the total number
of employees in the tax administration will have a negative impact on the level of the
grey economy. Improving the efﬁciency of the tax administration and hiring more efﬁ-
cient tax auditors (Escobari, 2012) will lead to higher tax compliance and a lower level
of the grey economy. In other words β1 and β3 should be negative. On the other hand,
an increase in the rate of unemployment will have a positive impact on the level of the
grey economy (β2 is positive). Namely, the unemployment rate is one of the standard
factors that is included in the econometric models of the informal economy (Schneider
& Erste, 2000), and the empirical studies often show that a rise of unemployment leads
to an increase in the grey economy (Krstić et al., 2013; Schneider, Büehn, &
Montenegro, 2010). Table 4 presents the results of the Linear regression at the 90%
conﬁdence level, using the Stata software.








Total number of employees in
tax administration** – Z3
Grey economy (%
of GDP)*** – y
Bulgaria 0.23 12.30 7.708 32.30
Czech
Rep.
0.23 7.00 14.710 16.40
Hungary 0.68 10.90 22.482 22.80
Serbia 0.46 22.40 6.856 30.10
Slovak
Rep.
0.72 14.00 8.781 16.00
Slovenia 1.00 8.90 2.330 16.00
Latvia 0.99 14.90 4.069 26.50
Lithuania 0.77 13.30 3.296 29.00
Finland 1.00 7.70 5.130 13.70
Estonia 0.53 10.20 1.555 28.60
Ireland 1.00 14.70 6.874 12.80
Portugal 1.00 15.90 11.566 19.40
Spain 1.00 25.00 27.613 19.20
Note: In the case of Serbia, the Rate of unemployment is published by Statistical ofﬁce of the Republic of
Serbia (2013), and the Grey economy (%GDP) in the research of Krstić, G. et al. (2013).
Source: *Eurostat (2013); **IOTA (2013); ***Schneider (2012).
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For verifying that the residuals are normally distributed, which is a very important
assumption for regression, the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data has been used. The
null hypothesis for this test is that the residuals are normally distributed. If the p-value
is greater than 0.10, then the null hypothesis will not be rejected. The p-value is
0.26855 and does not result in rejection of the null hypothesis, and residuals are
normally distributed.
Another important test is the test for heteroscedasticity, as the presence of
heteroscedasticity can invalidate statistical tests of signiﬁcance. One of the basic
assumptions for the ordinary least squares regression is the homogeneity of variance of
the residuals. Namely, the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity has been conducted.
If the p-value is 0.10 or smaller, then the null hypothesis is rejected and there is signiﬁ-
cant evidence of heteroscedasticity. The p-value is 0.8611 and there is no heteroscedas-
ticity in this case.
Regarding Table 4, R-squared is 0.509 (for social science this is fairly high), and
the Adjusted R-squared is 0.345. If the adjusted R-square value is much lower than the
R-square value, it is an indication that the regression equation may be over-ﬁtted to the
sample. These values are close, anticipating minimal shrinkage based on this indicator.
In order to test signiﬁcance, which is the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated
coefﬁcient, the general rule is that the p-value has to be less than the signiﬁcance level
(0.10). Since the p-value (0.0814) is less than 0.10 we do reject the null hypothesis that
the regression parameters are zero at signiﬁcance level 0.10. It can be concluded that
the parameters are jointly statistically signiﬁcant at signiﬁcance level 0.10. Analysing
separately, the DEA efﬁciency score and Rate of unemployment (%) are statistically
signiﬁcant with the p-value of 0.031 and 0.078 respectively. Furthermore, the DEA
efﬁciency score is statistically signiﬁcant at signiﬁcance level 0.05 as well. On the other
hand, the number of employees in the tax administration is statistically insigniﬁcant at
signiﬁcance level 0.10. Furthermore, a t-statistic above 2 or below –2 is considered sig-
niﬁcant at the 90% level, and this is in line with the previous conclusions.
The coefﬁcient tells how much the dependent variable is expected to increase when
that independent variable increases by one, holding all the other independent variables
constant and the sign on the coefﬁcient (positive or negative) gives the direction of the
effect. If the rate of unemployment and number of employees in the tax administration
are ﬁxed, then for each change (increase) of one unit in DEA efﬁciency score, the level
of the grey economy changes (decreases) by 14.071 units. Also, if the DEA efﬁciency
score and the number of employees in the tax administration are ﬁxed, then for each
change (increase) of one unit in the rate of unemployment, the level of the grey econ-
omy changes (increases) by 0.666 units. At the end, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
Table 4. Linear regression result.
Variables Coefﬁcient t test Prob




Total number of employees in
tax administration – Z3
−0.0003495 −1.59 0.147
Cons. 26.37869 4.84 0.001
R-squared = 0.509 Adj R-squared = 0.345 F (3, 9) = 3.11 Prob (F statistic) = 0.0814
Source: Authors’ calculation using the Stata software.
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linear dependence of the grey economy and the total number of employees in the tax
administration.
The ﬁndings have shown that increasing the efﬁciency of the tax administration leads
to a lower level of the grey economy. Improving the capacity of the tax administration is
an important element in ﬁghting tax evasion, which is the most important part of a grey
economy. Also, making it easier for taxpayers to comply with the tax obligations should
result in lower tax compliance costs. High tax compliance costs are sometimes the reason
for evading paying taxes. Regarding the rate of unemployment, the result indicates that
there is a positive relationship between the grey economy and the rate of unemployment.
The greater is unemployment, the greater is the grey economy. Unemployed people either
start their own business that is not registered or accept working as a non-registered
employee. This has a direct impact on the size of the grey economy.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, analysis has been done in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage the study utilises
an input oriented efﬁciency DEA model to assess the performance of the selected tax
administration under the assumptions of CRS. In the second stage, a regression analysis
has been conducted in order to assess the inﬂuence of chosen variables on the grey
economy, as an approximation of tax evasion and tax administration efﬁciency. The lim-
itation of the paper relates to the methodology of the research. Namely, the identiﬁcation
of input and output parameters in DEA analysis on one side and the selection of depen-
dent and independent variables in the regression analysis on the other side are the cru-
cial elements for conducting research and the obtained results. The identiﬁcation and
selection of parameters and variables are done based on already existing research in this
area and the professional experience of the authors, but this could be done in other ways
as well.
As mentioned, the three input and two output parameters are used for the DEA
analysis. For the regression analysis, three explanatory variables have been selected.
The obtained results have shown that ﬁve out of 13 tax administrations are found to be
relatively efﬁcient under DEA analysis. Based on the conducted analysis, the Serbian
Tax Administration has to use the Finnish Tax Administration as a benchmark. Compar-
ing results from both analyses, it can be generally concluded that countries with a rela-
tively efﬁcient tax administration have a signiﬁcantly lower level of the grey economy.
Namely, the average grey economy in Slovenia, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, as
a relative efﬁcient DMUs under the DEA analysis, is 16.2% of GDP. The average level
of the grey economy for all analysed countries is 21.7% of GDP, and for the relative
inefﬁcient DMU under the DEA analysis it is 25.2%. It has become obvious that an
efﬁcient tax administration is necessary to combat the grey economy and for creating an
environment where evading paying taxes is punishable.
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Note
1. The grey economy topic is discussed in the paper by Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).
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